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RECURSION AND THE 
QUESTION:  
‘WHEN IS ART?’ 






Two recent works by artist Tino Sehgal require us to ask again 
Goodman’s question, ‘when is art?’ No documentation of any 
sort—no recordings, no contract of sale, no notation of 
instructions, and neither script nor score—is provided of these 
works, which consist of little more than performances repeated 
for the duration of an exhibition and whatever commentary is 
made upon these in various formats and media (reviews, press 
listings, word-of-mouth, and so on). These works are clearly not 
things, in the everyday sense of the word. As Sehgal describes it, 
their production consists of the transformation of actions, not 
materials, and includes ‘de-production’, a process by which the 
work ‘undoes’ itself.2 So again, in this case the question ‘what is 
art?’, or indeed, ‘what kind of thing is art?’, is the wrong question to 
ask. Instead, with Goodman, we might address art as a temporal 
rather than a substantive problem. 
That said, in answering the question ‘when?’ with regard to 
these works, it will be necessary to take into account something 
dismissed by Goodman in his own attempt to provide clues as to 
when a particular symbolic activity can be described as artistic—
namely, self-reference. I contend that a crucial aspect of what 
these works do as art is to make self-reference productive, or 
more precisely, recursive. To understand how this is done will 
require us to supplement Goodman’s insights with the theoretical 
resources of a particular field of criticism derived from second-
order cybernetics, which for some time has worked through how 
self-reference is productive of recursive forms. 
First of all, here is a summary of each of the works and of what 
might be at stake in them. 
 
                                                             
1 Graduate paper presented at the 2011 British Society of Aesthetics Annual 
Conference at the Old College, University of Edinburgh, 16th to 18th 
September. 
2Tino Sehgal, no title, in Kremer, M., Hlavajova, M. and Fletcher, A. eds., Now 
What? Artists Write! (Utrecht/Frankfurt: BAK/Revolver, 2004), 170. 
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This Objective of That Object (2004). Passing through a corridor in 
the ICA, London, a visitor is approached by five people walking 
backwards toward her until she is surrounded. These five 
‘performers’ speak in unison the following phrase, first muttered 
quietly and then declared clearly and repeatedly: ‘The objective of 
this work is to become the object of a discussion’. If the visitor 
makes no comment, of whatever kind, then after a few minutes 
the performers will sink to floor, still speaking the phrase, but 
weakly and disjointedly, until all of them lay still and silent. If, 
however, the visitor comments at all, which might be just clearing 
her throat, grumbling beneath her breath, or laughing, the 
performers will exclaim excitedly: ‘We have a comment! We have 
a comment! Who will answer?’ One of them will volunteer, and a 
conversation will begin among them until they have another 
comment, and so on. 
This appears to be a work in need of its own commentary, 
without which it ceases to continue. In order to include this 
commentary, the work must, paradoxically, repeat itself in 
something other than itself. It does this by taking the visitor’s 
comment as the object of conversation. This distributes the work 
in such a way that the visitor cannot be uninvolved in its 
continuation,3 certainly, but more importantly, the work repeats 
itself in something other than itself. As the use of this and that in 
the title demonstrates, the work divides in order to be posited. 
 
This Success, This Failure (2007). For this work, Sehgal opened the 
same ICA gallery space as a playground for children from nearby 
inner-city schools. Provided with neither props nor toys, the 
children were given two instructions: first, that they create their 
own means of play, and second, that when a visitor to the gallery 
encounters them playing at least one of the children approaches 
that visitor, states her name and declares whether or not her play 
and the play of her co-performers is to be considered a success or 
a failure. The criteria for success and failure were given by the 
children themselves and were to act as a prompt for discussion. 
Arguably, just what these criteria might be is less significant than 
what the work does here. 
The visitor, once again, cannot be uninvolved in the form of the 
work once he or she is addressed by one of the players. More so 
than with This Objective of That Object, there is no observation that 
is not also participation. And once again the work divides as it is 
observed. The observation made by the visitor is one that is in 
communication with the player who has been instructed to leave 
the group of play and address this visitor. Communication might 
fail or it might develop in any number of more or less predictable 
ways, but however that may be, it is such that it always refers to a 
common object of observation—the children’s play, of course, 
but also the communication between observers of the work.  
                                                             




That the form of the work includes both of these indicates that 
in referring to itself the work must be itself and not itself, the 
same and not the same from one moment to the next. What is 
important is not how such a work might resolve this paradox but, 
as noted, how it is made recursive. This leads us again to the 
question, ‘when is art?’, because how the work takes time is bound 
to the mode by which its form recurs. 
So what is recursive form? 
 
 
a. Recursive Form 
 
One of the principal models of recursive form as it is developed 
within second-order cybernetics derives from the work of English 
mathematician George Spencer Brown, especially his Laws of 
Form, published in 1969. In elaborating a ‘calculus of form’, 
Spencer Brown attempts to demonstrate that the construction of 
a form is consistent with the construction of a world. The key 
operation of this construction is recursion, or what Spencer 
Brown terms ‘re-entry’. Some explanation is required. Take a 
form to be a distinction that has two sides, x/not-x (or, with our 
present examples, performers/visitors). Initially, the observation 
of the distinction is inseparable from the distinction itself. To be 
observed, the form requires a second distinction between 
observer and observed. The first observer (who drew the 
distinction) can be observed only by a second. The introduction 
of this ‘second-order’ observation is what Spencer Brown calls 
‘re-entry into the form’.4 
For a first-order observer, the difference x/not-x, although 
operative, remains invisible. Only with second-order observation 
does the difference x/not-x become visible inside the form. Self-
reference is not possible with first-order observation because the 
position of the observer, although presupposed, is not 
observable. Only second-order observation allows self-reference. 
But observed thus, the form is paradoxical, because without any 
reference to an external point of observation it is x and not-x at 
once. 
 
In summary, one can make the following claims. First of all, 
structurally, the form is both sides, x/not-x, at the same time, and 
therefore paradoxical; but operationally, the form is sequential—a 
sequence of preferences for one side or another of re-entered 
distinctions. This allows what is distinguished to be observed 
apart from the distinction itself, but only by performing 
observations sequentially. 5  Thus, as Francisco Varela once 
                                                             
4  George Spencer Brown, Laws of Form, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 
1969), 69.  
5 Niklas Luhmann, ‘The Paradox of Form’ in Dirk Baecker, ed. The Problems of 
Form, translated by M. Irmscher and L. Edwards, (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1999), 19. 
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declared, self-reference connects ‘quite naturally’ with time.6  A 
second point is that by understanding form in this way we are 
able to ask the question: where is the observer, or ‘who 
distinguishes and how’?7 This is an important question to ask of 
works that, on the one hand, and however minimally, 
choreograph observation and make this choreography observable, 
and on the other hand, present some object to be observed in the 
absence of the conventions of medium-specificity. 8  Thirdly, as 
form becomes recursive on the basis of re-entered observations, 
it also constructs, and does so in the face of indeterminacy. The 
indecision of the paradox of form (what is ‘inside’ and what is 
‘outside’, or who is a performer and who a visitor) is decided 
upon moment to moment, and those selections made with each 
decision now recur within the form. In this way, recursion 
constructs relatively stable objects on the basis of arbitrary or 
insignificant initial distinctions: a gallery visitor clearing her 
throat, the evaluative criteria of a childrens’ game, the instruction 
to approach a visitor, and so on. 
What guarantees a work of art’s status as a form is not whether 
or not it persists as a material object (however ill-defined such a 
description might be) but whether or not it constitutes a 
particular type of communicative event, the form of which recurs 
in further communications. Only through this recurrence is an 
object given.   
Von Foerster describes objects as tokens for stable behaviour in 
an autopoietic system. The ‘eigen-behaviour’ or constancy of 
objects is due to the recursive application of observations to their 
own results.9 This is how objects must be understood if observers 
are included in what they observe—or, arguably, if visitors are to 
be included as participants. 10  For an observer, an object is a 
recurrent selection and a constraint, and as a constraint, an object 
stands against an observer as something that objects to and restricts 
behaviour. A visitor clearing her throat, say, now becomes the 
                                                             
6 See Francisco Varela, ‘A Calculus for Self-Reference’, International Journal of 
General Systems, 2:1(1975), 20. 
7 David Roberts, ‘Self-Reference in Literature’, in Baecker, ed. The Problems of 
Form, 31. 
8 As Rosalind Krauss has argued, the collapse in the latter half of the twentieth 
century of those traditional techniques, materials and conventions of display 
that differentiated painting from sculpture, dance from film, and so on, and 
which served as the basis for medium-specific production and evaluation, has 
meant that medium, instead of being specific, must now be understood as a 
recursive structure capable of specifying itself. ‘A Voyage on the North Sea’: Art 
in the Age of the Post-Medium Condition, (London: Thames & Hudson, 1999), 7. 
9 Lynn Segal gives the example of a child playing with a ball: ‘After sufficient 
interaction, [the child] begins to experience the ball as an invariant. His 
recursive behaviour, operating on the result of his previous operations, reaches 
a stability.’ Segal, L. The Dream of Reality: Heinz von Foerster’s Constructivism, (New 
York: Norton & Co., 1986), 142.  
10  Heinz Von Foerster, ‘Objects: Tokens for (Eigen-) Behaviours’, in 
Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition, (New York: 
Springer, 2003), 261. 
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object of discussion, selected for further communications by 
which the form of the work recurs. 
 
Consider again This Success, This Failure. The instruction given to 
the player who addresses the visitor is an instruction to observe 
the form of the work within the form. The child must add an 
observation of success/failure to that of play/not-play. It is likely 
that this second-order observation was operative in the children’s 
play, but, arguably, it was not observed (this is very much a moot 
point). A child has to take herself out of play in order to observe 
that play, but in doing so she does not leave the form of the 
work. The address to a visitor furthers re-enters the form into the 
form, as an external reference (to the visitor) is asked to 
corroborate the self-reference of the form (the player’s 
evaluation). Already, at this stage, the work is complex, and will 
become more so as further observations become available for 
communication. If, for example, the player decides that their play 
was a failure, then the ‘other side’ of the distinction 
success/failure has been selected and what was latent (as the 
‘other side’ of the form of the children’s play) now becomes 
available on ‘this side’ of the form. This generates uncertainty in 
the form, but again, this uncertainty is made operational in time as 
the form of the work unfolds through further distinctions are 
drawn, selections are made, and observations are communicated. 
Thus the work of art acts recursively, allowing for multiple 
observations, some of which may question its own conditions of 
possibility without thereby undermining the continuity of its 
form.11 
 
b. The Question Again: When is Art? 
 
Goodman asks the question ‘when is art?’ in order to clarify 
how a theory of symbols might take account of a change in the 
status of art following the introduction of the ‘found object’ and 
‘so-called ‘conceptual art’’, where it becomes obvious that no one 
set of properties or functions can give an exhaustive description 
of those objects that achieve this status.12 Arguably, this account 
requires further development in light of the expanded and broadly 
theatrical status of works such as Sehgal’s and the problems of 
construction and temporality raised by them. 13  Goodman’s 
constructive ‘irrealism’ certainly remains pertinent here, because it 
is evident that the works under discussion do not require a ‘real 
world’ reference in order to carry out their worldmaking 
                                                             
11 Arguably, this is not a recent accomplishment. See Alexander Nagel, and 
Christopher S. Wood, Anachronic Renaissance, (New York: Zone Books, 2010), 
13. 
12 Nelson Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking, (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1978), 57. 
13  Works that are, as performances, ‘given to disappear’, to use Rebecca 
Schneider’s phrase (‘Performance Remains’, Performance Research 6.2 [2001], 
102), and yet which also recur through time, and so have what one might call 
depth in time. 
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operations. 14  It is curious, however, that in answering this 
question, Goodman dismisses self-reference as ‘too rare and 
idiosyncratic to carry any weight’.15 It is, for him, simply a special 
case of depiction whereby the symbol refers internally. 
Yet it seems that we must reconsider self-reference, if only 
because the five symptoms of the aesthetic that Goodman 
identifies do not appear to account for what is done by a work 
such as This Objective of That Object.16 As a symbol, such a work is 
fictional, which is to say that it is a representation with null 
denotation, but in a quite singular sense. We could describe it as a 
‘This Objective of That Object-work’, but that only begs the question. 
The title suggests that the work operates in the mode of the 
factual—the positing of this and that—as much as the fictional.17 
This is a shift from different modes of representation, then, to 
construction through fiction. But for there to be something 
referred to by this positing of this and that requires that the work 
refers to itself. In other words, it cannot be a predicate for itself 
until it posits this or that as a reference, and this requires the 
distribution of re-entered observations, as described above. 
The work does not function here as expression. We might 
describe what it does as exemplification, in the sense that the 
work both possesses and refers back to the label, to use 
Goodman’s term, that denotes it.18 But then of what is the work 
an example? What does it exhibit, typify, and show forth? It 
might possess any number of properties to which it refers and 
selects for observation, of course, but, primarily at least, what it 
appears to exhibit and exemplify is itself—the property of being 
this objective and that object. Exemplification is controversial as a 
symptom of the work of art and I am not going to pursue it in 
any detail here, other than to say that, in response to Margolis, by 
acting self-referentially, it is indeed possible for a work of art to 
present itself as an example. 19  In fact, if exemplification 
presupposes, problematically, an intention to exemplify, then it is, 
perhaps, precisely by the instruction to construct through self-
reference that a work of art performs such an intention. 
                                                             
14 Nelson Goodman, ‘Notes on the Well-Made World’, Erkenntnis, vol. 19, no. 
1/3 (1983), 106. 
15 ‘The cases cited are, of course, quite special ones, and the analogues among 
pictures—that is, pictures that are pictures of themselves or include themselves 
in what they depict can perhaps be set aside as too rare and idiosyncratic to 
carry any weight’; Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking, 60. 
16 Ibid. 67. The five symptoms are (1) synactic density, (2) semantic density, (3) 
relative repleteness, (4) exemplification, and (5) multiple and complex 
reference. For an earlier list of four symptoms, without (5), see Nelson 
Goodman, Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, (Indianapolis: 
Bobbs-Merrill, 1968), 252-255. 
17 Dorothea von Hantelmann, How to Do Things with Art, translated by J. Gaines 
and M. Turnbull, (Zurich/Dijon: JRP Ringier/Les presses du reel, 2010), 164. 
18 As Goodman claims, exemplification is ‘possession plus reference’; Languages 
of Art, 53. 
19 See Joseph Margolis, ‘What is When? When is What? Two Questions for 




Remember the repeated phrase that demonstrates the ‘intention’ 
of the work: ‘The objective of this work is to become the object 
of discussion’. It is possible that such recursive observations will 
be easier to attribute to the work of art itself when it takes human 
performers as its medium. 
 
In conclusion, we must return to how this brief consideration of 
self-reference and recursion might answer the question of ‘when 
is art?’ It is tempting to propose these two as additional 
‘symptoms’ for Goodman’s tentative list. That might be enough. 
But what Sehgal’s works demonstrate is that the recursive 
construction of the work that self-reference enables becomes 
necessary once it is a question of works distributed and organised 
without adherence to the conventional specifications of medium 
and without producing anything in particular. If such a work is not 
to disappear in the communications that it consists of, then it 
must in some way recur in these communications over time. This 
is precisely what self-referential observations of re-entry achieve, 
enabling something such as children’s play, whatever and 
whenever else it might be, to become the object of 
communication about itself and to function symbolically for a 
given time as a work of art in a way that also allows for its players 
to participate in the construction of that work. Thus, in a way that 
remains legible within Goodman’s account of ‘when is art?’, an 
understanding of recursive form allows us to describe what 
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